Since the summer a broad unanimity is made If the U

In announcing its intention to renew the mandate of Ben Bernanke at the head of the US Federal Reserve, the Obama President recalled that the former Professor of Princeton has avoided American economy suffer a new great depression. It is for this reason that the US Senate will soon confirm the presidential decision - and that the "time" magazine has named Bernanke as "man of the year". Since the summer, a broad unanimity is made: If the U.S. economic activity was known, after the tremendous shock that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers, only a brief - but violent - contraction, it is largely massive support by the Federal Reserve that it must. With heterodox measures which have led it for the first time to buy private debts by hundreds of billions of dollars, the Federal Reserve succeeded to break through an explosive rise in risk premiums spiral and to avoid disruption of the globalized financial system.

Intelligence and audacity of this tick poli can only be applauded. Wear on the balance sheet of the President of the Federal Reserve this only masterful action, on the pretext that the criticism after the fact is easy, however, prevent to fully learn the lessons of a dramatic episode of our financial history. The problem is not whether yesterday the Federal Reserve could be better, but to do that tomorrow, in similar circumstances, he in go as well. Because, we forget too quickly, the crisis which took an acute form in fall 2008 crawling since July 2007. The announcement of the suspension of the three withdrawals managed by BNP Paribas, coming after several months of questions about the quality of the loan "subprime", triggered a rise in risk aversion and a freeze of the liquidity among financial operators. The very foundations of globalised financial intermediation is in are found unnerved. The "risk takers" ensuring this intermediation - banks investment, "hedge funds" and other vehicles off-balance sheet of the alternative banking system - used in effect in the short term to "wear" a large part of the issued debt. Since the beginning of the 2000s, they had thus helped "transform" thousands of billions of dollars of savings placed in liquid form in the emerging areas in housing loans to households in developed countries. The moment where, the aversion to risk being increased liquidity freezing, borrow short term became a problem, their position of processing became more untenable daily. Distress sales led to a decrease in the price of the titles worn by these "risk takers" and to an erosion of their capital which made the renewal of loans they needed still more uncertain.

The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was not an isolated accident, but the product of a chain which was threatening to take away, one after the other, in order of decreasing vulnerability, all risk takers. Why has the Federal Reserve waited this bankruptcy to stop a spiral with the destructive power measured by the rise of all premiums for risk (despite massive injections of liquidity) - was obvious months

The first reason is institutional: relief, as it did after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, stakeholders financial part of the risk that they could not more be - giving guarantees, in selling or buying protection purely and simply private - debt meant that the Central Bank take credit risk, what it does normally not. Where the proposal made by the economist Ricardo Caballero to put in place an insurance mechanism under quota which, by providing for automatic transfer of risk from the private to the public in financial crisis, strongly stifle the conduct of a chain similar to that which occurred. Institutional embarrassment is far however was only to play. For months, the Federal Reserve wished not to give the impression of coming to the aid of those who had "mistake" by quickly lowering interest rates. Its decline, committed with hesitation, much less rapid and free in 2000, had therefore no chance to stop, as she was able to do so in the past, the rise of aversion to the risk. With hindsight, a lesson must be drawn: the stability of our financial systems range is narrower that many thought. When regulation and adequate monitoring, the system fault dangerously approaches its limits, it is more time to deal with moral hazard. By all means preserve financial stability must become the only priority of the monetary authorities.